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I. INTRODUCTION
WITH RECENT HEADLINES such as “Trump Budget In-cludes ATC Giveaway” and “Trump Calls for Air Traffic
Control Spin-Off in Budget,” privatization of air traffic control
(ATC) services in the United States is a hot-button political is-
sue.1 Indeed, USA Today reports that President Donald Trump’s
call to privatize ATC was “one of his top priorities” in his 2017
budget.2 And, for the first time, legislation (H.R. 2997) privatiz-
ing the ATC made it out of committee.3
1 Thomas B. Haines, Trump Budget Includes ATC Giveaway, AIRCRAFT OWNERS &
PILOTS ASS’N (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/
2018/february/12/trump-budget-includes-atc-giveaway [https://perma.cc/
H99M-KP4E]; Melanie Zanona, Trump Calls for Air Traffic Control Spin-Off in
Budget, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/transportation/
324274-trump-calls-for-air-traffic-control-spin-off-in-budget [https://perma.cc/
9EQ3-GQHJ].
2 Bart Jansen, Trump Budget Continues to Support Air-Traffic Control Privatization,
USA TODAY (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/02/
12/trump-budget-continues-support-air-traffic-control-privatization/324331002/
[https://perma.cc/CPJ6-2S2W].
3 H.R. 2997, 115th Cong. (2017). The 2017 bill, known as the “21st Century
Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act” or the “21st Century
AIRR Act” (H.R. 2997), was approved by the House Transportation and Infra-
2018] ATC PRIVITIZATION 523
The discussion of ATC privatization is nothing new. Since the
1980s, several countries have privatized the management and
funding of their respective ATC services. And over the past two
decades, Congress, sitting Presidents, and aviation stakeholders
in the United States have debated whether the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) should continue to operate and modern-
ize the country’s ATC system or whether an independent, self-
financed organization, either public or private, should take on
this role.4
This article addresses whether a privatized ATC, as supported
by President Trump and the U.S. airlines, among others, is a
solution to a recognized problem or whether a privatized ATC
system would instead create a host of new problems, including
reducing equity, increasing costs, and compromising safety.
II. ATC: WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING
A. THE EXPONENTIAL GROWTH OF AIR TRAFFIC
NECESSITATES A STRONG ATC
In 1914, the first commercial plane flight occurred on an
eighteen-mile run of the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airboat Line car-
rying one paying passenger.5 Now, over one hundred years later,
approximately three-quarters of a billion passengers board com-
mercial flights in the United States each year.6 Going forward,
the FAA projects that domestic passenger enplanements will in-
crease by 2.4% a year between 2017 and 2037.7 The FAA also
forecasts that global enplanements will grow at 3.4% a year.8
These forecasts reflect the fact that commercial aviation is essen-
tial to our modern way of life and a driving force of the global
structure Committee with a 32–25 vote and is the first privatized ATC proposal to
make it out of committee. See H.R. 2997 – 115th Congress: 21st Century AIRR Act,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2997 [https://perma
.cc/F975-US77].
4 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-131, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: EX-
PERTS’ AND STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON KEY ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN A POTENTIAL RE-
STRUCTURING 1 (2016) [hereinafter AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: EXPERTS’ AND
STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS].
5 CLIFFORD WINSTON, LAST EXIT: PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE
U.S. TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 76 (2010).
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economy.9 Entire industries rely on the successful operation of
the national airspace system. Aviation accounts for more than
eleven million jobs and is responsible for more than 5% of the
gross domestic product of the United States.10 This large mar-
ket, its projected growth, and its worldwide dependency necessi-
tate a safe, efficient, and capable ATC system, both now and in
the years ahead.
B. U.S. AIRSPACE, THE BUSIEST AND ONE OF THE LARGEST
IN THE WORLD
The Air Traffic Organization (ATO) is the ATC operational
arm of the FAA and provides safe and efficient air navigation
services in the “busiest airspace” in the world.11 The ATO is re-
sponsible for 29.4 million square miles of airspace.12 The ATO’s
airspace covers more than 17% of the world and includes all of
the United States, large portions of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and the Gulf of Mexico.13
FIGURE 1
9 Air Traffic Organization, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/
office_org/headquarters_offices/ato/ [https://perma.cc/L5RH-KDYV].
10 Id.
11 Air Traffic, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/ [https://
perma.cc/9ML7-2TD8].
12 Air Traffic Organization, supra note 9.
13 Id.
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General depiction of the airspace controlled by the ATO14
The ATO employs more than 35,000 personnel, of which
more than 14,500 are air traffic controllers.15 The ATO operates
315 air traffic facilities, including twenty-one “enroute”16 control
centers, twenty-four stand-alone terminal radar approach con-
trol facilities, and more than 260 airport control towers across
the country.17
Some privatization has already taken place in the U.S. ATC
system. The Federal Contract Tower Program (also overseen by
ATO) comprises more than 250 airport towers run by private
operators in 46 states and four U.S. territories.18 Controllers and
other staff in contract towers are employees of the contractor,
not of the federal government. The FAA also has contracted out
operations at flight service stations that provide weather brief-
ings and flight planning services to pilots.19
C. THE FAA FUNDS ATC THROUGH TAXES AND USER FEES
ATC and the modernization of air traffic facilities are funded
through two FAA accounts with a total budget of nearly $13 bil-
lion in 2016.20 The first, an operations and maintenance ac-
count, funds air traffic operations as well as aviation safety
programs unrelated to air traffic control. That account had a
fiscal year 2016 authorization of $9.91 billion.21 The second, a
facilities and equipment account, had a $2.85 billion authoriza-
tion in fiscal year 2016. The second account provides funding
for the acquisition and maintenance of air traffic facilities,
14 See Overflight Fees, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/in-
ternational_aviation/overflight_fees/ [https://perma.cc/8Z52-5REP].
15 Air Traffic Organization, supra note 9.
16 “En route” is frequently spelled “enroute” in aviation parlance. See, e.g., Digi-
tal Products, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/
aeronav/digital_products/ifr/ [https://perma.cc/79L4-US5Z].
17 A Plan for the Future: 10-Year Strategy for the Air Traffic Control Workforce,
2014–2023, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. 9–10 (2014), https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/
publications/controller_staffing/media/2017_CWP.pdf [https://perma.cc/
FN6S-2BAT] [hereinafter FAA Plan for the Future].
18 Bart Elias, Air Traffic Inc.: Considerations Regarding the Corporatization of Air
Traffic Control, CONG. RES. SERV. 2 (May 16, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43844.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SQK-ULC3].
19 Dan Namowitz, Privatizing Flight Service Saved Money, Faces New Challenges,
AOPA ONLINE (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/
2016/december/08/privatizing-flight-service-saved-money-faces-new-challenges
[https://perma.cc/8J2A-B55G].
20 FAA Plan for the Future, supra note 17, at 48.
21 Elias, supra note 18, at 2.
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equipment, engineering, research and development, and the
evaluation of innovative technologies.22
Slightly over two-thirds of the FAA’s total funding, and all
funding for the facilities and equipment account, is provided
through the Airport and Airway Trust Fund.23 Revenue sources
for the trust fund include “a 7.5% passenger ticket tax, a 4.3
cent-per-gallon tax on commercial jet fuel, a 21.8 cent-per-gal-
lon tax on general aviation jet fuel, and other taxes on cargo,
frequent flyer awards, [and] international departures and arriv-
als.”24 The FAA also “collects user fees from aircraft that fly in
U.S.-controlled airspace but do not take off from or land in the
United States.”25 A portion of these fees, which are “similar to
overflight fees charged by other countries in conformance with
agreements of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO),” are also used to fund ATC services.26
D. NEXTGEN: THE FAA’S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
FOR THE U.S. AIRSPACE SYSTEM
Since the early 2000s, the FAA has been working to modern-
ize the U.S. airspace system through a program called Next Gen-
eration Air Transportation System (NextGen).27 NextGen
deployment has been progressing steadily over the last few
years.28 “[The FAA] is about halfway through [its] multi-year in-
vestment and implementation plan” for NextGen and reports
that NextGen will make flying safer, more efficient, and more
predictable.29 “NextGen is not one technology, product, or
goal[,]” but dozens of new technologies that the FAA is develop-
ing and implementing.30 The interconnected systems of





26 Fees are charged in conformance with agreements of the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). See id.
27 NextGen Frequently Asked Questions, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa
.gov/nextgen/faqs/ [https://perma.cc/9HFU-NXBW].
28 See Where We Are Now, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
where_we_are_now/ [https://perma.cc/SDF4-ZA2M].
29 NextGen Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 27; see also Modernization of U.S.
Airspace, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/ [https://perma
.cc/G43D-44B8].
30 NextGen Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 27; see also Modernization of U.S.
Airspace, supra note 29.
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how U.S. airspace system users see, navigate, and communicate.
As Michael Huerta, former FAA Administrator, put it: “NextGen
is like going from an impressionist painting to HDTV.”31
One of the FAA’s key NextGen modernizations is the adop-
tion of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B)
technology.32 ADS-B is an innovational satellite-enabled naviga-
tion system that far surpasses the capabilities of traditional
ground-based navigation.33 Aircraft equipped with ADS-B will
greatly enhance awareness of aircraft location and movement
for pilots and ATC.34 Current radar technology can take any-
where from five to twelve seconds to update an aircraft’s posi-
tion due to the rotation of radar equipment and associated
processing time.35 By contrast, “ADS-B equipment provides
[ATC] with updated aircraft information almost every second”
thereby enabling controllers to identify and resolve aircraft con-
flicts far more quickly and effectively.36 In addition, ADS-B can
provide aircraft positions at low altitudes where current ground-
based systems provide limited or no coverage due to terrain and
system limitations. Departure, enroute, arrival, and approach
procedures developed utilizing ADS-B reduce flying time, fuel
use, and aircraft exhaust emissions while getting passengers to
their destinations faster and at more predictable times.37
Moreover, pilots flying ADS-B equipped aircraft are provided
with weather and traffic position information that can be dis-
played or otherwise integrated into pilot or flight crew informa-
tion and alerts.38 The ADS-B system is currently active and
providing services to aircraft equipped with ADS-B receivers.39
31 How NextGen Works, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
how_nextgen_works/ [https://perma.cc/QSV7-JVJE]. According to the FAA,
Michael Huerta was FAA Administrator from January 7, 2013 to January 6, 2018.
Key Officials, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/about/key_officials/
[https://perma.cc/9A2B-8LNX].
32 New Technology, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/
how_nextgen_works/new_technology/ [https://perma.cc/U8PB-F6B5].
33 Id.




37 New Technology, supra note 32.
38 Ins and Outs, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equip
adsb/capabilities/ins_outs/ [https://perma.cc/3VDV-HWWA].
39 Id.
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Operations within a large majority of U.S.-controlled airspace
will require ADS-B equipage by January 1, 2020.40
NextGen also upgrades communication systems utilizing tech-
nologies similar to text messaging. New Data Communications
(Data Comm) systems have already begun assisting pilots and
ATC in communicating more quickly, easily, and with less risk of
miscommunication than voice radio communication over busy
frequencies.41 Standard VHF air band radio voice transmissions
take up significant air time because once ATC verbalizes the in-
formation to a flight, the pilot must repeat it back correctly.42 If
the read-back of information is incorrect, ATC and the pilot
must continue to trade voice exchanges until both confirm the
same information.43 “Meanwhile, other flight crews [must wait]
for the radio frequency to clear so they can have their turn to
receive, repeat, and confirm clearances.”44 By contrast, Data
Comm allows ATC to send instructions that pilots can then
“read, accept, and load into flight computers with the push of a
button.”45 Data Comm helps enable equipped operators to stay
on schedule and ensure passengers meet connecting flights.46
Data Comm also reduces the dangers associated with task satura-
tion, allowing both ATC and pilots to spend more time on other
critical tasks.47
The NextGen program has and will continue to significantly
improve overall capacity, performance, efficiency, and predict-
ability throughout U.S. airspace, allowing for increased traffic,
and, from the perspective of commercial passengers, more air-
space capacity (i.e., more flights), shorter flights, and fewer
delays.48
40 Equip ADS-B, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equip
adsb/ [https://perma.cc/N3CX-L2AZ].





45 Id.; see Joshua A. Kirsh, What is the Flight Management System? A Pilot Explains,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
flight/a10234/what-is-the-flight-management-system-a-pilot-explains-16606556/
[https://perma.cc/G23V-H6WS] (offering a description of flight management
systems).
46 Performance Success Stories, supra note 41.
47 Id.
48 See Modernization of U.S. Airspace, supra note 29.
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III. THE STATUS OF PRIVATIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND GLOBALLY
A. OTHER COUNTRIES USE PRIVATIZED ATC
Many nations, including Canada, the United Kingdom (U.K.),
France, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia have privatized or
partially privatized ATC systems.49 Nav Canada, the most popu-
lar model for proponents of privatization in the United States,
was established over two decades ago.50 Nav Canada operates in-
dependently of government funding and must be funded only
by publicly traded debt and service charges to ATC system
users.51 Nav Canada employs approximately 1,900 air traffic con-
trollers, 650 flight service specialists, and 700 technologists, and
manages approximately twelve million flights per year over eigh-
teen million square miles of air space, making it the world’s sec-
ond largest air navigation service by traffic volume—one-ninth
the size of the U.S. system.52
In the U.K., the regulatory oversight of civil aviation has been
licensed to a non-profit corporation, the Civil Aviation Authority
(UK CAA), since 2001.53 Within UK CAA is a private-public com-
pany called the National Air Traffic Control Services Company
(NATS), which “is a public private partnership between the Air-
line Group, which holds 42%, NATS staff who hold 5%, UK air-
port operator LHR Airports Limited with 4%, and the
government which holds 49%, and a golden share.”54
NATS is generally self-funded by revenue collected through a
complex system of air passenger duties that are updated yearly
49 See Aarian Marshall, So What’s the Deal With Air Traffic Control Reform?, WIRED
(June 6, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/06/trump-air-traffic-control-ex-
plained/ [https://perma.cc/DY6F-5ARB].
50 See About Us, NAV CANADA, http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/about-us [https://
perma.cc/49TK-VKE9].
51 Investor Relations, NAV CANADA, http://www.navcanada.ca/EN/about-us/
Pages/investor-relations.aspx [https://perma.cc/EU3U-67TF].
52 About Us, supra note 50; see Robert Poole, U.S., Canadian Air-Traffic Control
Compared, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-cana-
dian-air-traffic-control-compared-1467219369 (for size comparison information).
53 See CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY, https://www.gov.uk/government/organisa-
tions/civil-aviation-authority [https://perma.cc/BLQ8-SLCB].
54 Our Ownership, NAT’L AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVS. CO., https://www
.nats.aero/about-us/what-we-do/our-ownership-2014/ [https://perma.cc/LWS3-
RJS6]. A “golden share” is a type of share that gives its holder veto power over
changes to the company’s charter. A golden share holds special voting rights,
giving its holder the ability to block another shareholder from taking more than
a specific ratio of ordinary shares. See Golden Share, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www
.investopedia.com/terms/g/goldenshare.asp [https://perma.cc/XZ8B-MXLQ].
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and calculated based upon ticket type and distance from
London to the destination country’s capital city.55 In 2002, how-
ever, because of the slowed pace and bookings of airline flights
after September 11, 2001, NATS required a financial bailout of
£130 million, half of which came from taxpayer subsidies and
the other half from “airline contributions” (fare increases).56
Additionally, significant parts of U.K. airspace have been out-
sourced to a foreign private ATC service company. In 2016, ATC
services at Gatwick Airport, the country’s second largest airport,
was contracted out to German-based Air Navigation Solutions,
which is wholly owned by the German government, under a ten-
year contract ending in 2025.57
B. THE ONGOING EFFORTS TO PRIVATIZE ATC
IN THE UNITED STATES
The idea of privatizing ATC services in the United States is
not new. Since the 1970s, proponents have made numerous pro-
posals to restructure ATC services.58 These proposals have dif-
fered significantly and were introduced in different economic
and political climates.59
Privatization has again started to gain traction due, in part, to
the election of President Trump, one of the most vocal propo-
nents of privatization. On February 9, 2017, at a gathering of
airline and airport executives, President Trump stated that the
current FAA-run ATC system is “a system that’s totally out of
whack. It’s way over budget. It’s way behind schedule. And when
[NextGen] is complete, it’s not going to be a good system.
Other than that, it’s fantastic.”60 On June 5, 2017, during what
was dubbed “Infrastructure Week,” President Trump gave a
speech on ATC privatization, which was followed by a faux sign-
55 See Rates for Air Passenger Duty, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/rates-
and-allowances-for-air-passenger-duty [https://perma.cc/JZF7-LDVD].
56 NATS Arranges £130m Bailout, AERO-NEWS NETWORK (June 13, 2002), www
.aero-news.net/index.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=f06d64ad-e065-48e4-aba2-5e762
302259e [https://perma.cc/9GJ4-9TYJ].
57 Bill Carey, German-Owned ATC Provider Takes Control of Gatwick Tower, AIN
TRANSPORT NEWS (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/air-
transport/2016-03-01/german-owned-atc-provider-takes-control-gatwick-tower
[https://perma.cc/R2KD-N934].
58 Elias, supra note 18, at 2–3.
59 Id.
60 Lauren Gardner, Trump Slams ‘Out of Whack’ FAA in Meeting with Airlines, PO-
LITICO (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-criticize-
faa-234849 [https://perma.cc/NZY3-7JWG].
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ing ceremony of airspace “principles” that were sent to Con-
gress.61 The President’s speech outlined what he called an “air
travel revolution,” which included handing over control of ATC
services to a private board that was part of a not-for-profit, feder-
ally chartered corporation that he professed would save the gov-
ernment money, reduce the cost of flying, and make air travel
more efficient.62
C. PROPONENTS OF PRIVATIZATION GAIN NOMINAL SUCCESS
WITH H.R. 2997
Just over two weeks after President Trump outlined his air
travel revolution, Congressman Bill Shuster, chairman of the
House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee, introduced
the 2017 21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and
Reauthorization Act, or the 21st Century AIRR Act (H.R.
2997).63 If enacted, H.R. 2997 would establish “the American Air
Navigation Services Corporation as a federally chartered, not-
for-profit corporation” to take over “operational control of FAA
air traffic services.”64 H.R. 2997 is the first bill privatizing the
U.S. ATC system to make it out of committee.65
The proposed American Air Navigation Services Corporation
(AANS) would be operated without investors, authorized to
charge fees to users of ATC services,66 and allowed to issue
bonds and other debt instruments to raise money for capital in-
vestments.67 According to Congressman Shuster, AANS would:
• Be independent of the federal government;
• Provide ATC services;
61 Henry Grabar, Trump Thinks Privatizing Air Traffic Control Is a No-Brainer.




63 H.R. 2997, 115th Cong. (2017). H.R. 2997 would also address certification of
commercial transport of property by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), a.k.a.
drones. See H.R. 2997, Subtitle B—Unmanned Aircraft Systems.
64 See H.R. 2997 – 115th Congress: 21st Century AIRR Act, GOVTRACK, https://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/115/hr2997 [https://perma.cc/JD7L-TLRB].
65 Id.
66 H.R. 2997 does exempt general aviation, including both piston and turbine
powered aircraft. However, H.R. 2997 does not provide an appeal process to air-
space or traffic routing changes unless the appeal involves a concern about safety,
as opposed to one based upon access to facilities. Telephone Interview with
Christa Lucas, NBAA Vice President of Government Affairs (Jan. 1, 2018).
67 Elias, supra note 18, at 11.
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• Be governed by a board of directors nominated by system
users but with a fiduciary duty only to the new entity;
• Be directly regulated by the FAA and the DOT in addition
to being subject to congressional oversight like every other
transportation business;
• Recoup its costs through user fees;
• Have access to capital markets to finance capital projects
and other business requirements; and
• Comply with presidential orders for the Department of De-
fense to assume control of the airspace in times of war.68
A Board of Directors (BoD) and a Board of Advisors (BoA)
would govern AANS.69 The BoA would have “up to 15 members
representing commercial service airports, general aviation inter-
ests, aerospace manufacturers, operators of commercial un-
manned aircraft, appropriate labor organizations, small
communities, and the Department of Defense.”70
The thirteen-member BoD would be primarily composed of
individuals representing certain aviation stakeholder groups.71
Specifically, the BoD would have the following structure:72
(1) A CEO (selected by the rest of the BoD);
(2) Two directors appointed by the Secretary of
Transportation;
(3) Four directors nominated by the “principal organization
representing mainline air carriers” (i.e., A4A);
(4) Two directors nominated by the “principal organization
representing noncommercial owner and recreational op-
erators of general aviation aircraft” (e.g., AOPA);
(5) One director nominated by the “principal organization
representing owners, operators and users of general avia-
tion aircraft used exclusively in furtherance of business
enterprises” (e.g., National Business Aviation Association
(NBAA));
(6) One director nominated by the “principal organization
representing aerospace manufacturers” (e.g., Aerospace
Industries Association);
(7) One director nominated by the “principal organization
engaged in collective bargaining on behalf of air traffic
68 Bill Shuster, The Case for ATC Reform, 30 AIR & SPACE LAW. 3 (2017).
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controllers employed by the Corporation” (e.g., National
Air Traffic Controllers Association);
(8) One director nominated by the “certified collective bar-
gaining representatives of airline pilots with the appoint-
ment of representing organization rotating every 3 years.”
(e.g., Air Line Pilots Association).
Each director would serve a three-year term and could not be a
government employee or work for AANS or any of the custom-
ers, bargaining agents, or suppliers of the corporation.73
A key responsibility of the BoD under this proposal would be
to set charges and fees for air navigation services. The bill speci-
fies that fees would be set in compliance with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) policies and would not be im-
posed on military aircraft, piston engine-powered aircraft, non-
commercial jets, or commuter air taxi flights operated in remote
locations, effectively limiting fees to passenger and cargo airline
operations and some commuter flights or air taxis in turboprops
and turbojets.74
D. PRIVATIZATION PROPONENTS ARGUE THAT U.S. ATC IS
TECHNOLOGICALLY BEHIND AND SUPPORTED
BY UNPREDICTABLE FUNDING
Advocates of ATC privatization, such as President Trump,
most U.S. airlines (with the notable exception of Delta Air
Lines), and the National Air Traffic Controls Association
(NATCA),75 contend that “efforts to modernize ATC in the
United States are over budget, behind schedule, and far less ad-
73 Robert Puentes & Rui Neiva, Time for Reform: Delivering Modern Air Traffic
Control, ENO CENTER FOR TRANSP., Feb. 17–18, 2017.
74 See H.R. 2997, 115th Cong. (2017).
75 While NATCA currently supports ATC privatization through H.R. 2997, it is
worth noting that seven unions representing thousands of FAA employee do not.
In fact, on May 16, 2017, these seven unions sent a joint letter to the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which stated that “overhauling
the entire aviation system by removing air traffic control from federal oversight
and funding will be a serious setback for its development and growth. Our air
traffic control system is a national public asset and we strongly believe it should
remain in the public trust.” Letter from Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emps. et al., to the
Hon. Bill Shuster, U.S.H.R. et al. (May 16, 2017), available at https://www.afge
.org/globalassets/documents/generalreports/faa-privatization-letter.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/NV7A-UAD8].
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vanced than in other countries.”76 Proponents also argue that
U.S. ATC relies on old technology, including 1930s-style radio
beacons and 1950s radar surveillance. In addition, privatization
supporters maintain that federal funding for ATC is both unsta-
ble and unpredictable, highlighting the recent government
shutdowns and the frequent Congressional budgetary show-
downs that seem to have become commonplace over the last sev-
eral years.77 Furthermore, some pro-privatization advocates
believe that having the same agency operate the system and reg-
ulate its safety is a conflict of interest, which compromises
safety.78 Thus, the creation of the AANS would separate and es-
tablish an arm’s-length relationship between the air navigation
services provider and the regulator.79
Proponents are also quick to point out that the FAA has al-
ready contracted out air traffic control functions under the
FAA’s Federal Contract Tower program. Under this program,
which is overseen by the FAA, more than 250 low-activity towers
are currently being operated by one of three private companies
under contract with the FAA: Midwest Air Traffic Control, RVA
Robinson Aviation, and Serco.80 A 2003 audit by the DOT In-
spector General found that average operating costs at twelve
contract towers were each $917,000 per year lower than those at
comparable FAA-run towers.81 Those cost savings were attrib-
uted primarily to lower staffing levels and lower salaries at con-
tract towers.82
76 Robert Poole, A Vote to Modernize the Air Traffic Control System, OC REGISTER
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/10/06/a-vote-to-modernize-
the-air-traffic-control-system/ [https://perma.cc/9RCT-DVBH].
77 See Jansen, supra note 2.
78 Poole, A Vote to Modernize the Air Traffic Control System, supra note 76.
79 Id.
80 See About USCTA, U.S. CONTRACT TOWER ASSOC., https://www.aaae.org/
aaae/USCTA/About/USCTA/About/About.aspx (last visited Dec. 26, 2017).
81 Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Safety, Cost, and
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E. OPPONENTS OF PRIVATIZATION DO NOT WANT ATC
DECISIONS MADE BY PRIVATE INTERESTS WITH
ONLY PROFIT MARGINS IN MIND
Opponents of privatization include more than thirty general
aviation (GA) groups,83 labor unions,84 Delta Air Lines,85 Cap-
tain Sully Sullenberger and a number of other notable pilots,
and former NASA astronauts.86 Opponents contend that priva-
tization would negatively impact safety and fair access to U.S.
airspace by shifting control of ATC to private interests and sub-
stantial influence by the airlines.87 Under H.R. 2997, opponents
argue that private interests that control the AANS BoD would
make the critical decisions that shape the ATC system, and that
these decisions would be made to benefit private interests and
their profit margins at the expense of the American public.88
Captain Sullenberger is a vocal opponent of ATC
privatization:
We have a wonderful, unique freedom and privilege in this coun-
try—an unfettered aviation system that anyone can participate in
safely and efficiently. Simply put, our aviation system is the big-
gest, the best and the most diverse in the world. And it is con-
stantly improving. In most other countries, it’s either too
restrictive or too expensive for an average person to fly, and the
only way one can fly is to go on an airliner or a military flight.
83 General Aviation Groups United in Opposition to HR 2997, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION
ASSOC. (June 30, 2017), https://www.nbaa.org/advocacy/letters/20170630-gen-
eral-aviation-groups-united-in-opposition-to-hr-2997.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AW9T-HPFZ].
84 Letter from Dep’t for Prof’l Employees AFL-CIO to Congress (July 13,
2017), available at http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-content/uploads/Anti-ATC-Privatiza-
tion-Labor-Letter-2017.07.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/DBX6-7YYF].
85 The Costs of Privatizing Air Traffic Control and How It Will Impact Airline Trav-
elers, DELTA AIRLINES (Feb. 1, 2016), https://news.delta.com/sites/default/files/
The%20Costs%20of%20Privatizing%20Air%20Traffic%20Control_0.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/3QTY-6X8D] [hereinafter Delta Study].
86 Sully Sullenberger, Miracle on Hudson Pilot: Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control,
USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/
10/18/miracle-hudson-pilot-dont-privatize-air-traffic-control-sully-sullenberger-
column/774063001/ [https://perma.cc/TYF2-2E69]; see also Former NASA Astro-




87 Justin Morrow, Don’t Privatize Air Traffic Control, TIMES FREE PRESS (Dec. 7,
2017), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/opinion/columns/story/2017/
dec/07/morrow/458677/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).
88 Id.
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Yet, if you hear the commercial airlines lately, they are telling all
of us that these are exactly the types of systems they want to emu-
late in their drive to privatize air traffic control.
The airlines are making a push in Congress to take this big, di-
verse, national asset that serves so many different communities,
aircraft and purposes and put it under the control of a narrow
board that would run air traffic control according to their own
interest. They say it would be easier to manage—but easier for
whom? They want to remove oversight of the air traffic control
system from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Con-
gress, and give it to a narrow group of stakeholders dominated by
the largest airlines. That benefits only the largest airlines, not the
American people.
If we go down this road, I’m worried about access. I’m worried
about equitability. And I’m worried about safety. Why would we
give our air traffic control system— the keys to the kingdom—to
the same people who shrink your airline seats, nickel-and-dime
you, and set sky-high prices for people trying to flee a hurricane?
Are these the people we want running our country’s aviation sys-
tem that oversees over 87,000 flights per day? The same people
who charge you an arm and a leg to check your bags and then
lose them?
. . . .
The airlines, as a business, have their own agenda, but it is not
our American agenda. There is a reason that local communities,
consumer groups and voters overwhelmingly oppose the idea of
air traffic control privatization. It is a bad idea, and it would ben-
efit only one industry.
Passengers deserve better. Our communities deserve better.
America deserves better. We must protect and preserve our avia-
tion system’s basic sense of fairness, safety, security and access.89
While NATCA has recently changed its position regarding
ATC privatization, a 2003 report commissioned by NATCA con-
tends that a privatized system cannot properly address the main
concerns advanced by its advocates. The report found that pri-
vate ATC monopolies fail to deliver effective results “in any of
the three criteria that prompt privatization consideration: re-
ducing cost, increasing the speed of modernization, and stabiliz-
89 Sullenberger, supra note 86.
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ing funding.”90 Furthermore, privatized ATC systems tend to
impose greater costs on the flying public and are prone to tech-
nological failure, and privatizers ultimately rely on government
backing to costly effect.91
IV. IS THERE AN ATC “PROBLEM” IN THE U.S. FOR
WHICH PRIVATIZATION WOULD
PROVIDE A “SOLUTION”?
Proponents of ATC privatization argue the current FAA-oper-
ated ATC system is inefficient and claim privatization would in-
crease efficiency. The two key assumptions privatization
proponents rely on are: (1) that FAA-operated ATC is not doing
a good or efficient job; and (2) that privatized ATC would do a
much better and more efficient job. Both of those assumptions,
which are not often challenged in the public debate, are
questionable.
First, the asserted lack of efficiency in the FAA-operated sys-
tem is overstated and raises the important question of whether a
complete ATC overhaul by privatization is an outsized “solution”
when compared with the current system’s more minor
problems. Proponents appear to ignore the technological up-
grades and savings in both cost and time already realized
through NextGen.92 Numerous pilot and aerospace groups have
taken the position that the FAA is not “bleeding money” and
point out that modernizations through NextGen have “saved
our nation $2.72 billion in passenger time, fuel and operating
costs [and that] dismantling the current ATC will cost far more
money.”93 Most importantly, the safety of the current FAA-oper-
ated ATC system in the United States is widely accepted. U.S. air
carriers, despite now being major proponents of privatization,




92 See The Truth About ATC Privatization, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASSOC., https://
www.nbaa.org/advocacy/issues/modernization/truth-about-atc-privatization/
[https://perma.cc/6SZ7-J4KK].
93 Col. Keith Zuegel (Ret.), Congress Risks National Security and U.S. Aviation,
FED. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.federaltimes.com/opinions/2018/01/
16/congress-risks-national-security-and-us-aviation/ [https://perma.cc/CTE8-
SABR]. Colonel Keith Zuegel is a retired Air Force officer and is currently the Air
Force Association’s senior director of government relations. See id.
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once heralded the U.S. system as the “safest ATC system in the
world.”94
Moreover, according to DOT data, the travel delays that air-
lines have blamed on the current ATC system are mostly due to
the poor scheduling practices of the airlines themselves that do
not account for weather, among other things.95 In fact, the ma-
jority of “ATC delays” do not actually stem from poor ATC per-
formance. Delays occur when too many airplanes attempt to use
the same runway for the given weather conditions.96 Obviously,
ATC has no control over the weather, airline scheduling, or the
number of runways at an airport, yet the airlines have so regu-
larly beaten “ATC delays” into everyone’s heads that most peo-
ple do not know what that phrase means.97 The FAA already has
systems like ADS-B and Data Comm in place to assist airlines as
well as other operators and to minimize routing and procedural
delays.98 Unfortunately, the airlines have been excessively slow
to equip their aircraft to take advantage of these new systems
and, instead, routinely shift the unwarranted blame for delays
upon ATC.99 Currently, only 2–5% of the airline fleet is
equipped for ADS-B, despite the FAA mandate that aircraft op-
erating in U.S. airspace be equipped with ADS-B by January 1,
2020.100 Many airlines have requested extensions of up to five
years to equip their aircraft with ADS-B.101 Unlike the airlines,
many private and business aircraft have been equipped with
ADS-B and Data Comm for years and routinely make use of the
technology to save time, money, and fuel.102
94 A4A CEO Calio: The United States has the World’s Safest ATC System, but It Needs
Improvement, AIRLINES FOR AM. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://airlines.org/news/faa-
reauthorization-hearing/ [https://perma.cc/T42K-LMTG].
95 Robert W. Mann, Jr., Opinion: The Case For ATC Privatization in U.S. is Weak,




98 Equip ADS-B, supra note 40.
99 Joe Kildea, ATC Privatization Pitfalls: Point by Point, AIRCRAFT OWNERS & PI-
LOTS ASS’N (July 12, 2017), https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/
2017/july/12/get-the-facts-about-atc-privatization [https://perma.cc/J6TL-
7PZN].
100 Equip ADS-B, supra note 40.
101 Paul Bertorelli, Airline Foot Dragging on ADS-B, AVWEB (May 17, 2015),
https://www.avweb.com/blogs/insider/Airline-Foot-Dragging-on-ADS-B-224099-
1.html [https://perma.cc/46QE-JKBS].
102 It Pays to Plan Ahead for ADS-B Equipage, NAT’L BUS. AVIATION ASSOC. (June
13, 2017), https://www.nbaa.org/ops/cns/adsb/it-pays-to-plan-ahead-for-ads-b-
equipage.php [https://perma.cc/69LS-WCVC].
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While the current FAA-operated ATC system is not perfect
and, as is the case with almost any organization, could find ways
to improve its efficiency, the proponents of privatization have
overstated the purported “problems” by ignoring the significant
improvements of NextGen and inappropriately scapegoating
ATC for delays and inefficiencies that are the fault of the airlines
and their refusal to utilize the best available technology. In do-
ing so, proponents of ATC privatization have inaccurately cast
the situation as such a significant problem that a massive over-
haul in the form of privatization would not be out of propor-
tion. In reality, privatization is a far-out-of-proportion “solution”
to any real inefficiencies in the FAA-operated system. The much
smaller scale of actual ATC inefficiencies can likely be readily
addressed through ordinary means such as audits and Congres-
sional oversight with a focus on addressing and remedying
inefficiencies.
While the wholesale overhaul and privatization of ATC in the
United States presents a far outsized solution to the purported
problems with the current system, there are very legitimate rea-
sons to question the belief that privatization will actually im-
prove efficiency of the system. In the debate over privatization,
the efficiency of a wholesale privatized system is often held out
and regarded as a given—but it should not be.
The first potential problem is with the scale of the wholesale
privatization of ATC in the United States. The U.S. ATC system
is enormous in comparison to other ATC systems in the world
and privatizing the entire system would be an undertaking on an
unprecedented scale. Successful transitions to private operation
of ATC on much smaller scales in other countries and the small
privatization of the FAA’s Federal Contract Tower program does
not guarantee a successful transition of the entire U.S. ATC sys-
tem. Though Canada has the second largest ATC system in the
world, even proponents of privatization admit the U.S. system
handles nine times more traffic than NAV Canada.103 In regard
to the size of U.S. ATC in comparison to other countries, “[o]ur
ATC system is so much larger and more complex than anyone
else’s that it would be hard to compare. For example, most
other nations don’t have much, if any, general aviation activ-
103 Poole, U.S., Canadian Air-Traffic Control Compared, supra note 52.
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ity.”104 In its 2016 report about Privatization of ATC, the U.S.
Government Accountability Office stated that “[a]ny ATC re-
structuring would be a difficult, complex, challenging multi-year
effort.”105 Comparing and contrasting what has worked else-
where with the U.S. ATC system is like comparing construction
of a small-town courthouse to that of a skyscraper.106
Privatizing ATC in the United States will likely pose a monu-
mental challenge and introduce many unanticipated problems.
Adoption of a privatized model will presumably put NextGen
modernization on hold for a significant amount of time while
the FAA transfers control to the new privatized entity. This delay
would not address the problems proponents argue is the fault of
the FAA, and the United States will risk losing precious time and
money in its current drive through NextGen, among other
things, to improve its ATC system. More importantly, ATC priva-
tization “risks degradation rather than improvement of the ATC
system.”107 Potential problems arising in such a monumental
transition should, of course, be considered in relation to the
comparatively small scale purported “problems” the transition is
intended to address.
Additionally, privatization is not entitled to a presumption
that a privatized ATC system will inherently improve efficiency
over the current government-run system. As discussed above,
the FAA-operated system is funded through a combination of
taxes and appropriations as determined by Congress. All the for-
eign ATC privatizations, and the one proposed in H.R. 2997,
have one element in common: they are all based on the assump-
tion that the system will be self-supporting through user fees.108
In Canada, “ATC operations are primarily funded through
“user fees,” which are paid by aircraft owners or operators based
on the weight of the aircraft and the distance traveled.”109 “From
1996 to 2012, Canada saw an additional 59 percent increase in
ATC fees.”110 Privatization supporters have argued for a shift to
104 Ron Rapp, NBAA Interview, THE HOUSE OF RAPP (Sept. 20, 2017), http://
www.rapp.org/archives/2017/09/nbaa-interview/ [https://perma.cc/PX6K-G9Y
3].
105 AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL: EXPERTS’ AND STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS, supra note 4, at
2.
106 See generally BURJ KHALIFA, http://www.burjkhalifa.ae/en/index.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2YU7-FAPR] (describing the world’s tallest skyscraper).
107 Sclar, supra note 90, at 13.
108 Id.
109 Delta Study, supra note 85, at 7.
110 Id. at 2.
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user fees as the primary source of ATC revenue, claiming it will
eliminate federal fuel and ticket taxes.111 Yet industry reports in
Canada have shown that ATC privatization does not prevent air-
line tax increases at either federal or local levels.112 One exam-
ple is the aviation fuel tax in Ontario, Canada: in 2014 the
Ontario government approved a plan to increase the tax from
its previous rate of 2.7 cents per liter to a new rate of 6.7 cents by
2017—a total increase of approximately 148%.113 Even so, the
private ATC funding source of user fees did not dissuade Onta-
rio officials from raising a tax that would have supported ATC
under a publicly funded system.114
In Canada, the cost increases resulting from privatization have
forced many Canadians to cross the border into the United
States to seek lower fares.115 In a 2012 interview, Canadian trav-
eler Dennis Linton of Langley, British Columbia, who drove
thirty miles across the border for his flight to Vegas, stated,
“There is a significant cost savings for us to actually come to the
likes of Bellingham airport rather than flying out of our Vancou-
ver International . . . . I’d say it was in the neighborhood of
about 35–40 percent. It actually is quite a significant savings.”116
Due to the influx of Canadian passengers, the airport in Belling-
ham, Washington, has nearly quadrupled its business in the past
five years.117 As the Conference Board of Canada reported in
2012, factors including air navigation fees of $20–25 per round-
trip passenger (on trips over 800 miles) gave a 30% cost advan-
tage to U.S. air carriers.118
“The labor intensive[ ] and inherently monopolistic nature of
[ATC] provision undermines effective private provision.”119
Such a monopolistic entity, regardless of its profit or not-for-
111 Id. at 7.
112 Id.
113 Id.; Gasoline Tax, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF FINANCE, https://www.fin
.gov.on.ca/en/tax/gt/ [https://perma.cc/AER8-MWA8].
114 Delta Study, supra note 85, at 7.
115 John Ryan, Small US Airports Attracting Bargain-Hunting Canadians, PUB. RA-
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profit status, would have little incentive to keep fees at a mini-
mum, as evidenced by the cost increases for ATC in both Europe
and Canada.120 Significantly, and based on the FAA’s proprie-
tary cost model and analysis, it is estimated that U.S. ATC priva-
tization could lead to a 30% or greater cost increase if
equivalent levels of ATC services were provided by private con-
tractors.121 Also, the time to transition to a privatized system
could take five years.122 Ultimately, according to the research of
Columbia University Professor Elliott Sclar, “once cost of train-
ing and liability expenses are appropriately taken into account,
the [United States] will spend more in its efforts to privatize
ATC than the FAA would spend to provide the same service.”123
In addition, as the Congressional Budget Office calculated, H.R.
2997 would increase the nation’s deficit by $98.5 billion over ten
years.124 While privation proponents tout the success and cost
savings associated with the FAA’s Federal Contract Tower pro-
gram as a justification for ATC privatization, privatization of the
U.S. ATC system with the same level of service currently pro-
vided by the FAA would not save money.
Even worse, fluctuating fees or mismanagement of a priva-
tized ATC could lead to fiscal crises that the FAA-operated sys-
tem is largely shielded from. As noted, in 2002, NATS required a
financial bailout of £130 million from taxpayers and a raise in
fees after the global decline in air travel after September 11,
2001.125 Additionally, contention regarding user fees and oper-
ating costs are presently forcing Switzerland’s privatized ATC
operator, skyguide, to further reduce its operating costs, which
in the past had disastrous consequences for skyguide, as ad-
dressed below.126 In labor-intensive service industries like ATC,
reductions in operating costs customarily require staff minimiza-
tion strategies. Bailouts and cost reductions to the point of inad-
equate ATC services are far from the improved efficiency that
privatization is typically presumed to bring in the U.S. debate.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 5.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, H.R. 2997: 21ST CENTURY AVIATION INNOVATION, RE-
FORM, AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT 2 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files?
file=115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/hr2997_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
54DT-PKZS].
125 NATS Arranges £130m Bailout, supra note 56.
126 Elias, supra note 18, at 19.
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V. ATC PRIVATIZATION MAY INTRODUCE NEW
PROBLEMS OF FAIRNESS IN HOW ATC COSTS
ARE BORNE AND IN OPEN ACCESS
TO U.S. AIRSPACE
The U.S. government presently finances ATC in part through
an excise tax based upon the value of airline tickets, resulting in
a progressive tax model.127 A switch to a flat per-seat fee struc-
ture would change the system to one where all travelers pay the
same user fee, so as a proportion of a lower fare ticket, an ATC
user fee would be higher.128 To the extent that air travel is price
elastic, this switch means that the most budget-conscious trav-
elers bear the highest proportion of air travel costs for a priva-
tized ATC system, either out of pocket or by simply cutting back
on air travel.129 That, in turn, means that the low cost carriers
will bear a disproportionate share of the costs and will undoubt-
edly protest the loudest over any attempt to raise fees. Simply
put, the move towards privatization represents a move toward a
firmer hold on the industry by the largest oligopolic carriers
that are not as sensitive to pass-through user fees as low-cost op-
erators, and, as a matter of equity, the cost will be borne by
those least able to pay.130
Instead of a regressive user fee system, opponents of ATC
privatization believe that “the fuel tax is the best possible mecha-
nism for the aviation community to pay for its use of the sys-
tem.”131 “The fuel tax is easy to understand, easy to pay, and
there’s no recordkeeping or policy burden,” said Ed Bolen,
CEO of NBAA, in a 2015 expert panel discussion.132 “Contrast
that with user fees in the rest of the world. Everywhere we see a
privatized ATC, it’s funded with user fees. We haven’t seen a
privatized ATC that works in the way we would like [i.e., not
potentially disruptive to fair access to airspace] in the United
States.”133
Under H.R. 2997, airline stakeholders would appoint one-
third of the AANS board members while the government would
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appoint only three of fifteen available board seats.134 Delta Air
Lines argues that under the proposed privatized model, control
of ATC would be “ceded to airlines and corporate entities that
would then have a larger say in priorities.”135 AANS likely would
set its own priorities, which may or may not be the same as those
of either the FAA, which is charged with responsibility for the
safety and security of the national air space, or the users who pay
fees to the proposed AANS.
This airline control could disrupt fair access to U.S. airspace,
a defining characteristic of aviation in the United States as com-
pared to most other countries in the world. It could result in
greater financial strain on smaller airports that serve rural com-
munities and other populations located outside major urban
centers because priority by the AANS would be given to support
ATC infrastructure at airports that service airlines versus those
that do not.136 Pilot organizations, members of Congress, and
personnel at smaller airports are concerned that under a priva-
tized system, the focus on ATC and critical infrastructure main-
tenance and improvements would shift away from balancing the
needs of both smaller and larger airports.137 Senator Moran (R-
KS), an opponent of ATC privatization, recently stated:
From an aviation point of view, it means that they [the airlines]
would have positions on the board of this private organization
. . . . I have no doubt that what they would emphasize is commer-
cial air traffic in large megacities. So it means the commercial
side would receive the emphasis, not the general aviation side.138
While the impact of an airline-centric privatized ATC on
smaller U.S. airports is not known, it is foreseeable that, given
the AANS would be funded by airlines through pass-through
user fees, smaller airports without a large airline presence may
struggle with infrastructure improvements and thus may not be
134 Delta Study, supra note 85, at 2.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 9.
137 Barney Helmick, Coconino Voices: Air Traffic Control Privatization Would Cut
Off Northern Arizona, ARIZONA DAILY SUN (Jan. 10, 2018), https://azdailysun.com/
opinion/columnists/coconino-voices-air-traffic-control-privatization-would-cut-
off-northern/article_a5a5c50b-0e4d-5648-9f6b-5b588552ca8f.html, see also Jake
Hoffner, My Voice: Yankton Airport Critical to Community, ARGUS LEADER (Jan. 26,
2018), www.argusleader.com/story/opinion/voices/2018/01/26/voice-yankton-
airport-critical-community/109847380/ [https://perma.cc/9LZH-CQEB].
138 Don Lefler, Moran Defies Trump, Says Private Air Traffic Control Would Harm
Wichita Industry, WICHITA EAGLE (Jan. 31, 2018) https://www.kansas.com/news/
politics-government/article197662894.html [https://perma.cc/CD6C-4Y38].
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able to support commercial operations, which in turn may force
air travelers in the community to venture out to large urban air-
ports to access the same commercial air service currently availa-
ble close to home.139 Accordingly, ATC privatization under H.R.
2997 could reduce fair access to U.S. airspace and fundamen-
tally change how aviation works in the United States.
VI. A PRIVATIZED ATC MAY REDUCE SAFETY AS THE
SKIES BECOME MORE CROWDED
The form of ATC privatization currently being proposed in
the United States is problematic in numerous respects and may
detrimentally impact air traffic efficiency and deny fair access to
the skies. But all of those issues must take a back seat to the
paramount issue of safety.
Aircraft travel is our era’s safest mode of transportation, par-
ticularly in the United States. Regardless of whether government
or private entities render ATC services, there will always be a risk
of system failures due to human error. Tragically, there have
been numerous aircraft crashes and untold numbers of near
misses that have been at least partially attributed to ATC acts or
omissions, irrespective of whether those services were provided
by governments or private companies.
However, in the United States, ATC services are standardized
and controlled by the FAA with enhancement of procedures
and services, from a safety standpoint, taking place incre-
mentally over time. This is due to the United States’ National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)/FAA relationship wherein
prior accidents and incidents result in lessons learned and
changes implemented that, over time, result in the increased
safety of the entire aviation system. This system of incremental
improvement following from these lessons and corrections,
through the interplay of the NTSB and FAA, is largely responsi-
ble for the amazing safety record of U.S. airlines over the past
several years. There have been no passenger deaths on a Part
121140 U.S. airline flight since the 2009 Colgan Air crash in up-
state New York.141 Even proponents of privatization agree that
139 See id.
140 See Sarah Fritts, What is the Difference Between Part 91.121 and 135?, THINK
AVIATION (June 1, 2018), www.thinkaviation.net/difference-between-part-91-121-
135 [https://perma.cc/5EPK-SXCB].
141 The February 12, 2009, Colgan Air Flight 3407 was a U.S. airline crash in-
volving passenger fatalities. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., LOSS OF CONTROL ON
APPROACH, COLGAN AIR, INC., OPERATING AS CONTINENTAL CONNECTION FLIGHT
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the ATC system operated by the FAA in the United States, while
not perfect, is the safest ATC system in the world.
Will passing control of ATC services from the FAA to private
operators have a negative effect on safety as the skies get even
more crowded? The answer to this question is complex, and
some proponents of ATC privatization contend that shifting
away from government-controlled ATC would actually improve
safety by removing what they see as an internal conflict in a sys-
tem both operated and regulated by the FAA.142 However, pri-
vate ATC service providers can be susceptible to unique
economic forces with the potential to impact quality, effective-
ness, and safety. Privatized ATC services have raised concerns
that the desire to maximize economic efficiency could compro-
mise safety. The ATC services provided by skyguide143 (Swiss Air
Navigation Services Limited), one of many privatized air naviga-
tion service providers (ANSPs)144 worldwide, led to the 2002
crash of Bashkirian 2937 because of an attempt to lower costs by
increasing controller hours while simultaneously mismanaging
critical ATC technology.145
3407, BOMBARDIER DHC 8 400, N200WQ, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/
AccidentReports/Pages/AAR1001.aspx [https://perma.cc/MQ85-WCJZ].
142 Shuster, supra note 68.
143 The company name “skyguide” is officially written in lower-case. See About
Us, SKYGUIDE, https://www.skyguide.ch/en/company/about-us/ [https://perma
.cc/EY6X-SYQT].
144 According to the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation, an ANSP typi-
cally provides air traffic services that include (1) air traffic control functions to
maintain safe separation between aircraft; (2) acquisition and maintenance of air
navigation equipment; (3) development and dissemination of procedures and
data for safe navigation of the airspace; and (4) air traffic management tech-
niques to make efficient use of available airports and airspace, improve traffic
flow, and expand airspace and airport capacity. The term “air navigation services”
encompasses all of these components and has been adopted internationally to
refer to the activities carried out by entities performing these functions, which
are known globally as air navigation service providers (ANSPs). See https://www
.canso.org [https://perma.cc/ULM8-Y4RM].
145 See GER. FED. BUREAU OF AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS INVESTIGATION (BUNDESSTELLE
FU¨R FLUGUNFALLUNTERSUCHUNG), AX001-1-2/02, INVESTIGATION REPORT 110
(2004), available at https://www.bfu-web.de/EN/Publications/Investigation%20
Report/2002/Report_02_AX001-1-2_Ueberlingen_Report.pdf?__blob=publica
tionFile [https://perma.cc/89KS-X6QM] [hereinafter GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE
REPORT].
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A. 2002 U¨BERLINGEN MID-AIR COLLISION – A FAILURE OF
PRIVATIZED ATC SERVICES
On July 1, 2002, Bashkirian Airlines Tupolev TU154M146 char-
ter flight 2937 (Bashkirian 2937) took off from Moscow, Russia,
to Barcelona, Spain, carrying sixty passengers and five crew
members.147 Forty-five of the passengers on the flight were Rus-
sian schoolchildren on a school trip to the sunny beaches of
Spain’s Costa Dorada148 organized by the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization committee.149
Bashkirian 2937 departed Moscow under instrument flight rules
(IFR) and flew on a southwest trajectory, heading over Belarus,
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Austria.150 While cruising at
36,000 feet near Vienna, Austria, the aircraft turned west, then
entered German airspace and headed towards Switzerland and
the vicinity of Lake Constance, a region where the borders of
Austria, Germany, and Switzerland meet.151
That same evening, DHL International Flight 611 (DHL 611),
a Boeing 757-200152 cargo flight to Brussels, Belgium, took off
from Bergamo, Italy.153 The DHL flight from Bergamo to Brus-
sels was also conducted under IFR with a planned cruise altitude
of 36,000 feet with two crewmembers and no passengers.154 Af-
ter departing Bergamo, DHL 611 headed northwest, crossing
the Swiss border. DHL 611 planned to fly north until reaching a
navigational aid near Stuttgart, Germany, then turn northwest
146 Id. at 6; see also Aircraft Technical Data & Specifications, AIRLINERS, http://www
.airliners.net/aircraft-data/tupolev-tu-154/376 [https://perma.cc/Q2T8-M7PH]
(describing the aircraft as a popular Russian tri-jet transport aircraft typically con-
figured to carry 150–190 passengers).
147 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 7.
148 The English translation of Costa Dorada is “Golden Coast” according to a
translation from http://dictionary.reverso.net/spanish-english/costa%20dorada
[https://perma.cc/GV7H-AFX9].
149 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 6–7.
150 Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/
11_main.cfm?TabID=1&LLID=84&LLTypeID=2 (last visited Dec. 12, 2017).
151 Id.
152 The airplane involved in the crash was an all-cargo configuration of the
Boeing 757-200 airliner. For further specifications, see Aircraft Technical Data &
Specifications, supra note 146; see also GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note
145, at 16.
153 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 6.
154 Id.
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to Brussels.155 This flight plan put DHL 611 at 36,000 feet some-
where in the vicinity of Lake Constance at the same time as
Bashkirian 2937.156
Both flights were in airspace controlled by Area Control
Center (ACC) Zurich, run by skyguide in accordance with the
requirements of ICAO157 and the “Letters of Agreement (LoA)”
between skyguide and the Swiss government.158 Skyguide is a pri-
vate joint-stock corporation under Swiss law responsible for en-
suring the safety of Swiss and adjoining airspace areas in
Germany, Austria, France, and Italy.159 Skyguide was created in
1996 when the Swiss government privatized its ATC services.160
Though skyguide’s stock is primarily owned by the Swiss govern-
ment, it is financially independent and does not receive public
funds; instead, skyguide is financed through user fees it col-
lects.161 Amongst the popular selling points associated with the
formation of skyguide was the promise of lower labor costs, ac-
celerated adoption of new and more reliable technology and in-
novation, and fewer ATC delays.162 However, such a system can
only be beneficial if the necessary regulatory mechanisms and
institutions are put into place.163 Unfortunately, those critical
components were missing and, due to a combination of stake-
holder pressure from the BoD and a lack of regulatory supervi-
sion, skyguide started to cut costs beyond a level acceptable
from a safety perspective.164
On the night of the collision, only one air traffic controller,
Peter Nielsen, was controlling the entire Zurich sector for over-
flight aircraft along with controlling arrivals and departures
155 Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, supra note 150.
156 Id.
157 INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., ANNEX 11 TO THE CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES § 3.5 (2001), https://www.theair-
linepilots.com/forumarchive/quickref/icao/annex11.pdf [https://perma.cc/
JRS9-9WTK].
158 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 35.
159 Id.
160 Id.; see also History, SKYGUIDE, https://www.skyguide.ch/en/company/about-
us/history/ [https://perma.cc/RF4U-8SH4].
161 See ERNST U. VON WEIZSA¨CKER ET AL., LIMITS TO PRIVATIZATION: HOW TO
AVOID TOO MUCH OF A GOOD THING: A REPORT TO THE CLUB OF ROME 106
(2005).
162 Anthony Adams, The Effects of Air Traffic Control Privatization on Operating Cost
and Flight Safety, 14 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE ED. & RES. 21, 26 (2005).
163 VON WEIZSA¨CKER ET AL., supra note 161, at 106.
164 Id.
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from the nearby Friedrichshafen airport.165 The arrivals and de-
partures were controlled from a workstation approximately ten
feet from the overflight control station.166 While skyguide regu-
lations required two controllers be on duty at all times, the
other controller on duty had left his work station to take an ex-
tended rest.167 According to a Swiss newspaper, skyguide’s man-
agement allowed employees to take breaks in violation of
regulations because skyguide budget cuts led to unfilled posi-
tions and increased workloads for controllers.168
As a result of the maintenance work on the Zurich facility’s
main radar system and phone lines, controllers were required to
utilize secondary systems that did not provide the same level of
sophistication as the primary systems.169 One of the systems that
was rendered completely inoperable was the visual Short-Term
Conflict Alert (STCA) system,170 which would visually alert a
controller to a possible impending collision approximately two
and a half minutes before a collision is forecast to occur.171 Ad-
ditionally, the maintenance work interfered with the proper op-
eration of the main and backup phone systems.172
Near the time Mr. Nielsen was controlling the Bashkirian
2937 and DHL 611 flights, an unexpected and unscheduled
165 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 75; see also Accident Over-
view of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL Boeing 757 over Ger-
many, supra note 150.
166 See Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, supra note 150.
167 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 75; see also Accident Over-
view of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL Boeing 757 over Ger-
many, supra note 150.
168 Edmund L. Andrews, Swiss Tell of Error Before Air Crash, N.Y. TIMES (July 4,
2002) https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/04/world/swiss-tell-of-controller-er-
ror-before-air-crash.html; see also GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145,
at 90–92.
169 See GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 38–39.
170 This system is crucial for the monitoring of air traffic by ATC. If aircraft
come onto a collision course, they usually appear on the monitoring screen as
blinking red dots instead of green dots in normal circumstances, and an acoustic
signal is given. Without this system, traffic control demands considerably more
attention, and air safety is radically reduced when the slightest diversion or prob-
lem arises for the controller.
171 STCA is an ATC system that provides alerts of impending aircraft collisions
based on algorithmic software computational forecasts in ways similar to the
alerts provided to pilots and aircrews from onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance
Systems (TCAS), but at greater range. See GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra
note 145, at 88–89.
172 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 39.
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flight contacted Friedrichshafen airport to land.173 Because Niel-
son was the only controller, this additional flight required him
to get up from one workstation and move to another.174 Opera-
tional procedures in place at the time required Nielsen to
phone the tower at Friedrichshafen to advise personnel there of
the approaching aircraft.175 But because the phone systems were
not working, a fact Nielsen did not know, he was unable to con-
tact the Friedrichshafen tower.176 After numerous unsuccessful
and time-consuming attempts to contact the tower, Nielsen fi-
nally asked the Friedrichshafen-bound flight to contact the
tower directly.177 This prolonged interruption from his duties at
his primary workstation for overflight traffic caused a significant
lapse in attention to Bashkirian 2937 and DHL 611, which were
now on a fatal collision course.178
A controller at Upper Area Control Karlsruhe, a nearby sector
that overlapped with ACC Zurich, was alerted by his properly
functioning STCA equipment that Bashkirian 2937 and DHL
611 were on a collision course and unsuccessfully attempted to
warn Nielsen by phone at the Zurich station no fewer than
eleven times.179 The Karlsruhe controller could have warned
both aircraft of the impending collision, but that action would
have violated published protocol requiring approval from the
controlling facility (i.e., ACC Zurich) before doing so.180 The
Karlsruhe controller followed the established protocol and did
not warn Bashkirian 2937 or DHL 611.181
Having dealt with the Friedrichshafen aircraft, Nielsen re-
turned to his station less than a minute before the collision and
only then became aware of the impending crash.182 In a scram-
173 Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, supra note 150.
174 Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, supra note 150.
175 Mayday Aircrash Investigate, DHL Flight 611 Deadly Mid Air Crash “The
U¨berlingen Disaster”, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v






180 Ashley Nunes & Todd Laursen, Identifying the Factors that Contributed to the
Ueberlingen Midair Collision: Implications for Overall System Safety, in HUMAN FACTORS
AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY 48TH ANNUAL MEETING PROCEEDINGS 4 (2004).
181 DHL Flight 611 Deadly Mid Air Crash “The U¨berlingen Disaster”, supra note 175.
182 Id.
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ble to respond, just forty-four seconds prior to the collision,
Nielsen issued an instruction to Bashkirian 2937 to expedite a
descent to 35,000 feet, which directly conflicted with conflict
avoidance resolution instructions from the Tupolev’s Traffic
Collision Avoidance System’s (TCAS), and also mistakenly ad-
vised the pilots to look for DHL 611 in the opposite direction
from which the aircraft was approaching.183 At approximately
9:35 p.m. local time, while both aircraft were operating under
IFR and in positive contact with ACC Zurich, Bashkirian 2937
and DHL 611 collided184 over the German town of
U¨eberlingen.185 The collision caused DHL 611 to lose nearly all
of its vertical stabilizer.186 Bashkirian 2937 broke into several
pieces after being nearly severed in half by DHL 611’s tail.187
Neither aircraft was controllable following the collision and
both airplanes hit the ground north of U¨eberlingen, killing eve-
ryone aboard both aircraft, including all forty-five school
children.188
B. SKYGUIDE’S PRIVATIZED STRUCTURE CAUSED THE
U¨BERLINGEN MID-AIR COLLISION
A major international effort ensued to investigate the crash.
Swiss, German, Russian, and American entities all took part, and
their reports revealed numerous shortcomings in skyguide that
contributed to the crash.189 Eight skyguide managers were in-
dicted for negligent homicide, among other charges.190 Nielsen
was blamed for not following proper procedures, though prose-
cutors, noting a “culture of negligence and lack of risk aware-
ness at skyguide,” maintained that the collision was not solely
183 Id.
184 See Accident Overview of Midair Collision of Bashkirian Airlines TU154 and DHL
Boeing 757 over Germany, supra note 150.
185 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 6.
186 DHL 611 lost approximately 80% of its vertical stabilizer. Boeing later
stated that the loss caused the airplane to become aerodynamically unstable in
the yaw axis. See GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 24.
187 GERMAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORT, supra note 145, at 9.
188 Id. at 6. Sixty-nine people were aboard Bashkirian 2937, and two people
were aboard DHL 611 for a total of seventy-one deaths attributable to the mid-air
collision.
189 Plane Crash Killing Trial Starts, BBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2005), http://news.bbc
.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4375338.stm [https://perma.cc/69AW-YC8V].
190 Harry Rosenbaum, 4 European Air Traffic Controllers Convicted of Negligent
Homicide in 2002 Crash, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2007, 5:48 PM), https://www
.seattletimes.com/business/4-european-air-traffic-controllers-convicted-of-negli
gent-homicide-in-2002-crash/.
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Nielsen’s fault.191 Though skyguide initially blamed the collision
on the crew of Bashkirian 2937, it eventually accepted responsi-
bility and asked relatives of the victims for forgiveness.192 Ulti-
mately, four skyguide middle managers were later convicted of
negligent homicide.193 Tragically, Nielsen was later stabbed to
death by a Russian man, Vitaly Kaloyev, whose wife and two chil-
dren were passengers on Bashkirian 2937.194 On its website,
skyguide describes the crash, stating, in part, that “[t]he tragic
dimension of this accident and of the subsequent events pro-
foundly changes the understanding of safety in Swiss and inter-
national aviation.”195
There is no dispute that skyguide’s cost-cutting measures con-
tributed to the crash. And it is apparent that the privatized na-
ture of skyguide was the driving force in the fatal cost cutting.
Certainly, skyguide’s privatized corporate structure resulted in
unique pressures to cut costs that do not apply to the FAA’s pro-
vision of ATC services in the United States. Skyguide is finan-
cially independent of the Swiss government and does not
operate on public funds. Instead, skyguide is funded through
user fees, receiving the majority of its revenue from charges on
overflights and additional revenue from approach charges paid
by aircraft using Swiss airports.196
Additionally, skyguide’s board was appointed by the Swiss gov-
ernment and comprised of representatives of the major players
in Swiss air transport, including a representative of Swissair.197
These operators, including Swissair’s representative, put pres-
sure on skyguide to reduce costs in order to keep down the fees
that the operators would pay for skyguide’s ATC services. Conse-
quently, despite greatly increased air traffic in Switzerland in the
years before the 2002 mid-air crash, skyguide barely increased
personnel levels.
191 4 Swiss Air Traffic Controllers Found Guilty in 2002 Crash, CANADIAN BROAD.
CORP. (Sept. 4, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/4-swiss-air-traffic-control
lers-found-guilty-in-2002-crash-1.676488 [https://perma.cc/78ZR-84VM].
192 Plane Crash Killing Trial Starts, supra note 189.
193 Rosenbaum, supra note 190.
194 The 2017 film, Aftermath, is loosely based on the disaster and the ensuing
actions of Vitaly Kaloyev. Aftermath, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt45815
76/ [https://perma.cc/H5VX-LNNG]; see generally AFTERMATH (Protozoa Pic-
tures 2017).
195 History, supra note 160.
196 Elias, supra note 18, at 18.
197 See VON WEIZSA¨CKER ET AL., supra note 161, at 104–05.
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Notably, the skyguide structural features that would have been
held out as selling points—independence from public funding
and competitive ATC service fees—ultimately led to cost cutting
to the point of compromised safety. In addition to the 2002 mid-
air crash, air traffic control incidents in Switzerland around the
same time were increasing and above the average of the Euro-
pean Union.198
Skyguide continues to be vulnerable to economic pressures
with significant potential to compromise safety. For example, in
2004, Swiss officials ordered skyguide to make significant finan-
cial cuts, even with many controller positions still left unfilled.199
Three years later, skyguide continued to be under political pres-
sure to fill forty-five vacant controller positions while simultane-
ously raising fees to plug holes in its finances.200 In recent years,
the revenue raised by skyguide’s user fees has suffered from de-
clining traffic, resulting in more cost-cutting measures and in-
creased user fees.201
In August 2016, skyguide controllers again caused an aircraft
crash resulting in the loss of life. Skyguide controllers assigned a
Swiss F/A-18 fighter bomber aircraft operating IFR an altitude
too low for surrounding terrain, and the aircraft crashed, killing
the pilot.202 Skyguide responded that “it will assume its responsi-
bility in the affair.”203 What precisely skyguide did or did not do
“in the affair” is unclear.
VII. AVOIDING SAFETY ISSUES IN A
PRIVATIZED U.S. SYSTEM
Privatized ATC services in the United States would not neces-
sarily be immune from the same economic pressures that im-
pacted skyguide and ultimately compromised safety. One of the
fundamental flaws in H.R. 2997 is that ATC cannot be competi-
tively bid because the profit-making, market-based incentives for
198 Id. at 106.




201 Elias, supra note 18, at 18–19.




554 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [83
efficiency and economy do not parallel the government’s over-
whelming interest in ensuring safety and security.204
AANS would, like skyguide, be funded by user fees. Addition-
ally, four of AANS’s directors would be nominated by the air-
lines, which are impacted by the user fees that AANS charges.
While H.R. 2997 would not permit the board members nomi-
nated by the airlines to actually work for the airlines, is that
enough to avoid the situation that occurred with skyguide,
where pressure exerted by Swissair and other carriers to keep
user fees low resulted in cost cutting to the point safety was com-
promised? It does not seem too much of a stretch to think that
board members nominated by the airlines might advance the
airlines’ interests, notwithstanding not being direct employees
of the airlines. As noted above, Delta has stated that under the
current proposed model, control of ATC would be “ceded to
airlines and corporate entities that would then have a larger say
in priorities.”205
Moreover, a fee-based sustainment structure would create a
whole new budget-balancing problem that is different from how
the FAA-operated ATC system is presently funded. Assuming the
budget can be initially worked out to result in adequate funding
so that safety is not compromised, the revenue source is bound
to fluctuate, as it has with skyguide, and budgets are likely to be
inefficiently managed so as to compromise the level of services
needed to ensure the U.S. ATC system remains the safest system
in the world. Indeed, skyguide is not the only example of the
compromises resulting from cost cutting in privatized ATC. Evi-
dence from Canada’s and Australia’s ANSPs suggests that safety
ultimately pays the price.206 Nav Canada, the pro-privatization’s
darling exemplar, has only been successful at keeping costs low
by negotiating with controllers for lower pay and longer hours,
resulting in controllers being stretched to the point of being un-
able to effectively perform their jobs.207
VIII. ATC PRIVATIZATION WOULD HAMPER THE
PRACTICE OF AVIATION LAW
Aviation law practitioners regularly need to gather data col-
lected by the FAA-operated ATC system, such as ATC accident
204 Sclar, supra note 90, at 4.
205 Delta Study, supra note 85, at 2.
206 Sclar, supra note 90, at 10.
207 Id.
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packages, ATC communications, radar data, weather briefings,
personnel and staffing information, and incident reports. That
data is vital evidence in litigation arising out of aviation acci-
dents. Privatization threatens preservation of and access to such
evidence.
Under the current FAA-operated ATC system, the public can
request FAA records under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) system. FOIA is often described as the law that keeps
citizens in the know about their government.208 Under FOIA,
agencies must disclose any information that is requested—un-
less that information is protected from public disclosure by a
FOIA exemption.209 This right to disclosure grants the public
access to a system that provides a consistent set of rules and pro-
cedures for information requests regarding aircraft, airmen, and
other records. Practitioners in aviation law regularly rely on
FOIA for preservation of and access to critical evidence in avia-
tion cases.
Under a privatized scheme, there may not be any protections
for or guarantees of information requested by the public.210 In
Canada, requests sent to Nav Canada for ATC-related data do
not go through a system like FOIA. Nav Canada sends all of the
requests “to the legal department” and encourages requestors to
instead request information from the Transportation Safety
Board of Canada.211 Nav Canada does not per se deny all re-
quests but does not regularly receive nor respond to requests for
ATC data.212 If the United States adopted a system like the one
in place in Canada, ATC documents and data might have to be
obtained through the NTSB docket and FOIA system, not the
FAA. This could be problematic in light of the fact that the
NTSB docket is often missing many items accessed and utilized
by, and otherwise available to, the NTSB in its investigations,
and the fact that the NTSB currently believes its FOIA obliga-
tions begin and end at what it decides to include in its dockets.
Preservation is also a concern. H.R. 2997 does not address re-
cord retention policies/procedures. Thus, AANS could set re-
tention policies/procedures that are not favorable to the public
208 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, http://www.foia.gov [https://perma.cc/
2Q8U-4QC9].
209 What is FOIA?, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, www.foia.gov/about.html
[https://perma.cc/V9JG-HQTG].
210 Telephone Interview with Christa Lucas, supra note 66.
211 Telephone Interview with John Fleming, Nav Canada (Nov. 2017).
212 Id.
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interest. For example, under the Contract Tower Program in
the United States, regional FOIA offices receive FOIA requests
for information from or involving contract towers. However, ac-
cording to the Renton, Washington, FOIA office, these requests
are forwarded onto the contractor running the tower and not
answered directly by the FAA’s FOIA office.213 Despite the FOIA
office’s statement that requests are forwarded, this author has
found that such requests are not typically forwarded but re-
turned with occasional contact information for the contractor.
In 2014, a FOIA request was sent to the Renton FAA Regional
FOIA office for records “substantiating events before, during
and after the rescue and recovery operations” of a fatal Cessna
208B crash that occurred the previous year in Hawaii.214 In re-
sponse, the requester received the following:
In an email dated June 5, 2014, you were provided with contact
Information for Serco Inc., for any available records from the
Molokai Federal Contract Tower. The State of Hawaii’s Depart-
ment of Transportation operates the Hana Airport, Kalaupapa
Airport, and Kapalua Airport and may also have records respon-
sive to your request. However, please be advised that the State of
Hawaii has no statutory obligation to respond to a FOIA
request.215
The tone and information in the FOIA response is far from a
positive indication that records would be forthcoming from pri-
vate ATC providers.
For purposes of this article, in November 2017, this author
sent out multiple FOIA requests to known contract towers for
documented aircraft gear-up landing incidents over the last
twenty-four months. While an FAA FOIA office did state that
there was a landing accident in August 2016 at the Arlington
Municipal Airport in Arlington, Texas (KGKY), it claimed to
have “no records” regarding this accident because KGKY was a
contract tower controlled by a private contractor. The email re-
ceived from the FAA FOIA office stated, in part:
213 Telephone Interview with unknown Renton, Wash., FOIA office personnel
(Nov. 2017).
214 See e-mail to Dianna Pfeifle, FOIA Officer, AJV-W52, Air Traffic Organiza-
tion (Mar. 20, 2014), available at https://butterdezillion.files.wordpress.com/
2014/07/faa-foia-request-2-and-disclosure-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRY8-
8U5P].
215 Response to FOIA Request 2014-008224WS from Kathryn M. Vernon, Re-
gional Administrator, FAA Nw. Mountain Region (June 6, 2014) (on file with
author).
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I am e-mailing to inform you that you have requested informa-
tion from a federal contract tower, Arlington Airport Traffic
Control Tower (ATCT). For these type of FOIA’s our office will
generate a “no records” response, as this is not an FAA facility.
However, please be advised that Arlington ATCT has no statutory
obligation to respond to a FOIA request. Please let me know if
you would like to continue with your request with a no records
response, or contact the Arlington ATCT to try to obtain the in-
formation from them and with your concurrence withdraw this
FOIA request. The Arlington Airport Traffic Control Tower
should have some data on this since it happened at their field.
Here is the Kathryn’s Report on the accident . . . .216
The privately-owned website Kathryn’s Report typically gath-
ers and hosts a compilation of news reports and NTSB docu-
ments for aircraft accidents.217 However, for this particular
incident, all the site had available was the NTSB report.218 If the
only publicly available information for contract towers is from
news and NTSB reports, aviation practitioners will have to resort
to requesting information from the contractor or by subpoena.
Even if documents are subpoenaed, it is unclear what, if any,
controls exist to ensure the preservation of data and informa-
tion gathered by privatized or contract ATC providers.
The FAA has also privatized weather briefing services by con-
tract with Lockheed Martin and by corporate merger with
Leidos.219 According to Leidos corporate personnel, it is not
subject to FOIA but is willing to respond to requests from the
public for flight briefings on a case-by-case basis if submitted
from an e-mail link on its “Flight Service” homepage.220 No in-
formation is provided as to how Lockheed Martin decides
whether it is “willing” to provide information, and it is unclear
what legal standards may apply to its preservation and disclosure
obligations.
216 E-mail from FAA FOIA office to Ross Neher (Feb. 2, 2018) (on file with
author).
217 See KATHRYN’S REPORT, www.kathrynsreport.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).
218 See Cessna 172S Skyhawk Skymates, Inc., N544SP: Accident Occurred August 09,
2016 in Arlington, Tarrant County, Texas, KATHRYN’S REPORT, www.kathrynsreport
.com/2016/08/cessna-172s-skyhawk-skymates-inc-n544sp.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2018).
219 See Loren Thompson, Leidos Deal Closes, Spawning Vast Solutions Enterprise,
FORBES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/
08/17/leidos-deal-closes-spawning-vast-solutions-enterprise/#5ab89f2d66e9
[https://perma.cc/L3LR-NRWK].
220 Telephone Interview with unknown Leidos personnel (Nov. 2017).
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H.R. 2997 does not contain any provisions addressing reten-
tion and disclosure of information and data under the priva-
tized system it purports to create. Arguably, like the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation, a.k.a. Amtrak, a privatized ATC
service provider in the United States might still be subject to
FOIA provisions, but it is far from certain how privatized ATC
service providers would respond to records requests, if at all.221
Additionally, ATC negligence claims against AANS would be
handled far differently from those involving ATC under the
FAA. Under H.R. 2997, employees of AANS would not be sub-
ject to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).222 Instead, H.R.
2997 would require that the corporation obtain and maintain
“adequate liability insurance policies and coverages, as deter-
mined by the Secretary, including complete indemnification of
employees of the Corporation for acts within the scope of em-
ployment.”223 This insurance requirement is similar to the cur-
rent requirement for Amtrak. Amtrak’s insurance has been a
recent matter of debate due to two recent high-profile train
crashes—Amtrak 501 in Washington and Amtrak 188 in Penn-
sylvania.224 Proponents of H.R. 2997 highlight that the speed of
handling potential claims could be faster in a non-governmental
structure versus the current FTCA system. However, opponents
of H.R. 2997 point out that, like Amtrak, claims handling could
require acts of Congress and result in prolonged civil actions.225
IX. CURRENT STATUS OF H.R. 2997 AND FUTURE
PROSPECTS FOR ATC PRIVATIZATION
Privatization of U.S. ATC would be a major undertaking re-
quiring significant political and financial capital. At the time of
this article, sponsors of H.R. 2997 had not yet brought the bill to
221 FOIA, AMTRAK, https://www.amtrak.com/about-amtrak/foia (last visited
Jan. 22, 2018).
222 21st Century Aviation Innovation, Reform, and Reauthorization Act, H.R.
2997, 115th Cong. § 90506 (2017).
223 Id.
224 See Chris Mondics, Amtrak Settles Train Crash Claims for $265 Million, PHIL.
INQUIRER (Oct. 27, 2016, 6:12 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/
transportation/20161028_Amtrak_settles_derailment_claims_for__265m.html
[https://perma.cc/9F6Z-DQG9].
225 See Josh Farley et al., Amtrak Train Going 81 Mph Just Before Derailing Around
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the floor of the House of Representatives because they did not
have the necessary votes for passage.226 If action does not take
place on H.R. 2997 before the end of the session, it will die but
may re-emerge in a new version in a later session.227 While there
is still support in the House of Representatives and from Presi-
dent Trump for H.R. 2997, there are some Republican Senators
opposed to privatization. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS) has stated
publicly, “I think we’ve got the Senate solidly lined up against
the administration and the House,” in regard to support for
H.R. 2997.228 If members of the same political party are not on
board with privatization, such an immense undertaking will
likely not be getting off the ground anytime soon. However, the
President’s budget blueprint continues to support privatization
of ATC as part of his $1.5 trillion infrastructure investment
plan.229
X. CONCLUSION
The modernization and advanced technology being imple-
mented through NextGen will save and enhance the lives of U.S.
taxpayers. The FAA’s ATC is presently imperfect, but even pro-
ponents of privatization agree that it is the safest system in the
world. Privatizing ATC “would put the traveling public at unnec-
essary risk.”230 Any changes to such an immense and complex
system must focus on safety first and not the bottom line. While
President Trump, most airlines, and the other proponents of
ATC privatization are very vocal in supporting privatization of
ATC, their claims that the FAA-operated ATC is inefficient and
outdated are overstated at best. The United States’ current ATC
system is the safest ATC system in the world and has made signif-
icant improvements in technology in the last decade. While the
current ATC system is not perfect, an entirely new privatized
ATC system is not the answer. Any inefficiencies in the current
ATC system can be remedied through efficiency audits and con-
gressional oversight, not by implementing an entirely untested
ATC system that is estimated to increase the nation’s deficit by
$98.5 billion over ten years. The presumption that a privatized
226 Telephone Interview with Christa Lucas, supra note 66.
227 See What Happens to Bills After Congress Adjourns?, POP VOX (Dec. 4, 2016),
https://blog.popvox.com/2016/12/04/what-happens-bill-after-congress-ad-
journs-updated/ [https://perma.cc/J3E6-R6J5].
228 Lefler, supra note 138.
229 Jansen, supra note 2.
230 Former NASA Astronauts: Abort Mission to Privatize ATC, supra note 86.
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system will inherently result in improved efficiency over a gov-
ernment-run system is unfounded: privatization based on a user
fee system may result in the need for government bailouts and
cost reductions to the point of inadequate ATC services and
safety reductions as occurred with skyguide. The current U.S.
ATC system is a public asset that should remain under public
control, not ceded to a corporation made up of a board “domi-
nated by the airlines and their allies, [with] the power to tax the
public, make industry-wide regulatory changes, and initiate sys-
tem changes without Federal oversight.”231
231 Press Release, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
CRS Finds Air Traffic Control Privatization Plan Likely Violates U.S. Constitution
(July 25, 2017), https://democrats-transportation.house.gov/news/press-re-
leases/crs-finds-air-traffic-control-privatization-plan-likely-violates-us-constitution
[https://perma.cc/8G97-B2A6].
